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INTRODUCTION
With computer networks now spanning the globe, law and
law enforcement agencies. must address the international dimen-
sions of crimes in cyberspace. Criminals in an electronic world
can ignore international boundaries, since they can send infor-
mation and execute commands via worldwide networks. Requir-
ing no physical presence and facilitated by the presence of the
Internet, electronic crimes are readily suited for international
commission.'
U.S. law enforcement has already had substantial experi-
ence in fighting international computer crime-specifically,
hackers. While computer hacking is one good example of an
international crime.in cyberspace, there are many other crimes
that are facilitated by computer networks, such as forgery and
counterfeiting, transmission of threats, fraud, copyright infringe-
ment, theft of trade secrets, transmission of child pornography,
interception of communications, and transmission of harassing
communications. The computer hacking cases have repeatedly
raised issues that will be of concern in all international elec-
tronic crime cases.
1. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has characterized the Internet as "an interna-
tional network of interconnected computers." Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334
(1997) (emphasis added).
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Therefore, this Essay summarizes some of the lessons from
those experiences and charts a future course. Part I describes a
few experiences with international computer hackers in order to
provide a context for the rest of the Essay. Part II extracts from
that experience the central issues that have arisen-and predict-
ably will continue to arise-in connection with investigating and
prosecuting international electronic crimes. These concerns are
divided into three subject areas: the substantive law, the proce-
dural law, and operational issues. Finally, Part III summarizes
international efforts to address concerns raised by crimes in
cyberspace.
While the development of cyberspace offers much promise
for international interaction and growth, it also facilitates the
commission of international crime. By identifying the critical in-
ternational issues relating to crimes in cyberspace and address-
ing them, countries can try to maintain for their citizens the
same security in the information society that they have tradition-
ally enjoyed.
I. EXPERIENCES WITH INTERNATIONAL
COMPUTER HACKERS
U.S. law enforcement already has substantial experience
with one kind of international electronic criminal-hackers. 2
Perhaps the most well-known example of international com-
puter crime was described by Cliff Stoll in his book The Cuckoo's
Egg.' In 1986, German hackers attacked computers operated by
the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, in Berkeley, California. An
investigation was initiated by graduate student Cliff Stoll, then
working as a system administrator at the victim site. Federal law
enforcement authorities initially showed no interest in the case
in the absence of a clear monetary loss. Stoll launched his own
investigation, however, which eventually led to the conviction of
three hackers in Germany. The investigation revealed that the
2. One relatively early commentator observed that, because a hacker need not be
physically present, "[c] omputer hacking is a crime unlike any other under international
law." RobertJ. Sciglimpaglia, Jr., Comment, Computer Hacking: A Global Offense, 3 PACE
Y.B. INr'L L. 199, 245 n.265 (1991). The growth and widespread use of the Internet
have taught that many kinds of electronic crimes, not just computer hacking, can be
substantially facilitated by means of international computer networks. See Part II.A.1.
3. See generally CLIFF STOLL, THE CUCKOO'S EGG: TRACKING A Spy THROUGH THE
MAZE OF COMPUTER ESPIONAGE (1989).
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hackers used access to the Lawrence Berkeley computers to ob-
tain access to many other U.S. computers. The hackers had ob-
tained sensitive information-such as munitions information, in-
formation on weapons systems, and technical data-and then
sold it to the KGB. This case demonstrated the importance of
confidentiality of information on computer systems and the diffi-
culty of determining a loss figure for a computer intrusion case
at the beginning of an investigation.
Since the Cuckoo's Egg case, federal law enforcement has
had experience with a variety of international computer crime
cases. A review of some of those cases can provide a helpful con-
text for considering the range of possible issues that can arise in
a computer-oriented criminal investigation and prosecution.
A. 1993: Danish Hackers Attack Weather Computers
In 1993, the National Weather Service in Maryland detected
hacker activity in its systems. Since air traffic and shipping oper-
ations rely on National Weather Service data, this attack
threatened to cause substantial damage. The intrusion was
traced back to computers at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology ("MIT") and then back to Denmark. U.S. and Danish
investigators identified thirty-two U.S. systems as well as systems
in other countries, including Denmark, that hackers had pene-
trated. Danish authorities made seven arrests, including two
juveniles. Six convictions resulted in Denmark, for attacks on
both Danish and U.S. computer systems.4
B. 1994: Wadimir Levin's Bank Fraud from Russia
Between June and October 1994, a theft ring headed by a
computer hacker in St. Petersburg, Russia broke into a Citibank
electronic money transfer system and attempted to steal more
than US$10 million by making approximately forty wire transfers
to accounts in Finland, Russia, Germany, the Netherlands, the
United States, Israel, and Switzerland.' All of these transfers, ex-
cept US$400,000, were recovered by Citibank.
4. See, e.g., Jerry Seper, 4 Arrested in Denmark for Computer Hacker Scheme, WASH.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1993, at A5, cited in Bradley S. Davis, Note, It's Virus Season Again, Has
Your Computer Been Vaccinated? A Survey of Computer Crime Legislation as a Response to Ma-
levolent Software, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 411, 419 n.51 (1994).
5. See, e.g., Dean Starkman, Russian Hacker Enters Fraud Plea in Citicorp Case, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 26, 1998, at A6.
19271999]
1928 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:1924
The leader, Vladimir Levin, was arrested in London, Eng-
land, and successfully extradited to the United States two years
later. In February 1998, Levin was sentenced to three years im-
prisonment and was ordered to pay US$240,000 in restitution to
Citibank. Several accomplices have also been convicted.
C. 1995-1996: Julio Cesar Ardita's Intrusion from Argentina
From August 1995 until February 1996, the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI") investigated a hacker who successfully obtained unau-
thorized access to multiple military, university, and other private
computer systems, many of which contained sensitive research.6
The hacker acquired unlimited access to those systems, includ-
ing the ability to read the sensitive materials stored in them.
U.S. authorities tracked the hacker to Argentina and noti-
fied a local telecommunications carrier. The telecommunica-
tions company contacted local law enforcement, which began its
own investigation. An Argentine investigating judge authorized
the search of the hacker's apartment and the seizure of his com-
puter equipment as the first step in an investigation of his poten-
tial criminal violations of Argentine law. The hacker was first
identified to law enforcement by his user name "griton" (Span-
ish for "screamer") and eventually identified as Julio Cesar
Ardita.
Ardita was investigated by the Argentineans for his intru-
sions into Argentine telecommunications systems, but Argentine
law did not extend to cover his crimes against computers in the
United States. For those crimes, only the United States could
prosecute him. In the absence of an extradition treaty with Ar-
gentina for these offenses, Ardita eventually agreed, in May
1998, to come to the United States and plead guilty to felony
charges of unlawfully intercepting communications and of dam-
aging files on U.S. Department of Defense and NASA com-
puters. He was fined US$5000 and sentenced to three years of
probation.7
6. This case thus stands in contrast to the Danish case described above, see supra
note 4 and accompanying text, where Denmark was able to prosecute for attacks- on
victims in the United States, and additional U.S. prosecution was therefore unnecessary.
7. See, e.g., Pamela Ferdinand, Argentine Pleads Guilty to Hacking U.S. Networks; Wire-
tap Led Authorities to Arrest, WAsH. PosT, May 20, 1998, at A23; Argentine Hacker who In-
vaded Pentagon Enters Guilty Plea, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1997, at B10.
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D. 1996: Florida 911 Attack from Sweden
In February 1996, the FBI investigated suspicious, phone
calls placed to the Northern Florida Emergency 911 system. The
hacker had been able to obtain direct telephone numbers that
corresponded to the lines used to receive 911 calls for eleven
counties. He used them to tie up emergency lines and harass
operators. A trace initiated by one affected phone company
identified a potential suspect in Sweden. Swedish authorities,
cooperating with the Washington Field Office of the FBI, exe-
cuted a search warrant on the residence of the subject, who
turned out to be a minor. The hacker was convicted of a misde-
meanor in Sweden and given a suspended sentence.8
E. 1996:' Miami Internet Service Provider Takeover from Germany
In July 1996, a hacker gained complete control over an In-
ternet Service Provider in Miami, Florida and captured credit
card information of the service's subscribers.9 He threatened to
destroy the system and distribute the credit card numbers unless
the victim provider paid US$30,000. Following investigation by
the U.S. Secret Service, German authorities arrested the hacker,
Andy Hendrata, when he tried to pick up the money at a post
office box. A twenty-seven-year old Indonesian computer sci-
ence student, Hendrata was prosecuted and convicted in Ger-
many. He was given a one-year suspended sentence and a
US$1500 fine.
F. 1998: Ehud "The Analyzer" Tenebaum's Pentagon Penetration
from Israel
On March 18, 1998, the Israeli National Police arrested
Ehud "The Analyzer" Tenenbaum, an Israeli citizen, for illegally
accessing computers belonging to the Israeli and U.S. govern-
ments, as well as hundreds of other commercial and educational
systems in the United States and elsewhere.10 The arrest of
Tenenbaum led to several weeks of investigation into a series of
8. See, e.g., 911 Lines Tied Up by Hacker-In Sweden, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 8, 1997,
at D4.
9. See, e.g., Matthew McAllester, Feds Aid Miami Company in Global Hunt for Hacker,
NEWSDAY, June 8, 1997, at A41.
10. See, e.g., Israeli Teenager Questioned in Pentagon Hacking Case, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19,
1998, at A4.
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computer intrusions into U.S. military systems that occurred in
February 1998. As part of this investigation, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice formally requested legal assistance from the Is-
raeli Ministry of Justice, and U.S. law enforcement agents trav-
eled to Israel to present Israeli law enforcement officials with
evidence. As part of this evidence, U.S. investigators also
presented the Israelis with evidence of Tenenbaum crimes
against Israeli computer systems.
On February 9, 1999, Tenenbaum was indicted by an Israeli
court, along with four accomplices. They were charged with ille-
gal entry into computers in the United States and Israel, includ-
ing U.S. and Israeli academic institutions and the Israeli Parlia-
ment.11 Further action in this case is pending.
II. ISSUES RAISED BY INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER CRIME
As noted above, the explosive growth of the Internet world-
wide has accelerated the ability of people to commit crime inter-
nationally by means of computers. While the Internet knows no
borders, criminal law and law enforcement agencies are con-
strained by the limits of their authority. Those limits are usually
reached at national borders.
While limitations related to national sovereignty are often
described as 'jurisdictional," these jurisdictional limitations arise
in many different forms. Substantive laws may apply to domestic
activity only, and even if they are given extra-territorial effect,
cooperation from a foreign country is more likely with regard to
activity that violates its domestic law. While some countries, such
as Denmark, Israel, and Sweden,1 2 may prosecute criminals for
attacks on foreign victims, other countries may be limited by
their legal authority to do so, as Argentina was in the Ardita
case.'" Procedural laws, such as those provisions that permit
tracing of telephone calls or other communications, have clear
jurisdiction over domestic processes only. At the operational
level, law enforcement agents are primarily stationed and have
jurisdiction to investigate crime domestically. A single electronic
crime case, however, can often raise a comprehensive set of in-
ternational issues.
11. See, e.g., Israel Indicts Hackers, PITrSBURGH POsT-GAzETrE, Feb. 10, 1999, at A4.
12. See supra notes 4, 10, 8, and accompanying text.
13. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Thus, problems created by the ease of commission of inter-
national electronic crimes are exacerbated by a variety of 'Juris-
dictional" constraints on law enforcement in protecting the pub-
lic against such crime. This confluence facilitates and indeed
invites commission of international crime because of the re-
duced risk of penalty. Commentators (and criminals, who freely
discuss such matters on the Internet) have already recognized
the ability to exploit safe havens. These safe havens may be used
for a variety of purposes, such as:
* using foreign anonymous remailers to facilitate copy-
right infringement or to transmit harassing messages or
child pornography;14
* operating gambling Web sites in countries friendly to
such activity;15 or
0 hacking through computers in jurisdictions lacking an
effective law enforcement presence before attacking an
intended victim system in yet another country.
These concerns demand a coherent response from the pub-
lic agencies that are charged with protecting public safety by en-
forcement of the criminal laws. In considering how to combat
such international crimes, it is helpful to catalogue the kinds of
novel legal problems raised for law enforcement: the substantive
issues, the procedural issues, and the practical issues. Their cu-
mulative effect is to make the task of fighting computer crime
more difficult.
A. Substantive Law
1. Absence of Substantive Laws
As mentioned above, the United States has a wide variety of
laws that prohibit crimes facilitated by computer networks.
These laws prohibit forgery and counterfeiting, transmission of
threats, computer hacking, fraud, copyright infringement, theft
of trade secrets, transmission of child pornography, interception
of communications, and transmission of harassing communica-
tions.1
6
14. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Edelstein, Note, Anonymity and International Law Enforce-
ment in Cyberspace, 7 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 231, 249-51 (1996).
15. See, e.g., John Edmund Hogan, Comment, World Wide Wager: The Feasibility of
Internet Gambling Regulation, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 815, 845 n.149, 853 n.179 (1998).
16. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 470-514 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (counterfeiting and for-
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Even in the United States, some of these laws are of rela-
tively recent vintage. For example, the last fifteen years have
brought about a substantial development of the criminal law of
intellectual property in the United States.17 U.S. Congress first
criminalized trademark counterfeiting in 1984,18 and the federal
law criminalizing theft of trade secrets was just enacted on Octo-
ber 11, 1996.19 While infringement of copyright has been a
crime, in certain cases, since 1909,20 Congress has in recent years
broadened the scope of federal copyright protection and en-
hanced criminal penalties, and, most recently, on December 16,
1997, President Clinton signed into law the No Electronic Theft
Act ("NET Act") .21 The NET Act permits prosecution in cases
involving large-scale illegal reproduction or distribution of copy-
righted works where the infringers act willfully but without a dis-
cernible profit motive.
For electronic violations that occur in countries where no
similar laws have been enacted, the crime may not be
gery); 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) (1994 & Supp. 1997) (threats to property and individuals); 18
U.S.C. § 875(c) (1994) (threats to injure individuals); 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (1994 & Supp.
1997) (access device fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (computer fraud
and abuse); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994) (wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994 & Supp.
1997) (interference with communications systems); 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (1994 & Supp.
1997) (theft of trade secrets); 18 U.S.C. 2252A (Supp. 1997) (child pornography); 18
U.S.C. § 2319 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (copyright infringement); 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (1994 &
Supp. 1997) (traffiking in counterfeit goods or services); 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1994 &
Supp. 1997) (interception of communications); 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994 & Supp. 1997)
(transmission of harassing and obscene communications).
17. See generally Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Department of
Justice, Federal Guidelines for Prosecution of Violations of Intellectual Property Rights (Copy-
rights, Trademarks and Trade Secrets) (1997) (visited Apr. 14, 1999) <http://
www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ip.html> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
18. See Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2178
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2320). For additional discussion of the crime of
trademark counterfeiting, see DavidJ. Goldstone & PeterJ. Toren, The Criminalization of
Trademark Counterfeiting, 31 CONN. L. REv. 1 (1998).
19. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3489 (codi-
fied at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839). For additional discussion of the Economic Espionage
Act of 1996, see James H.A. Pooley et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of
1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177 (1997).
20. See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 28, 35 Stat. 1082.
21. No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 506, 507, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319, 2319A, 2320); cf United States v.
LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994) (dismissing criminal indictment, prior to
passage of No Electronic Theft Act, for large-scale not-for-profit copyright infringe-
ment).
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prosecutable. Indeed, with the United States at the forefront of
the so-called "information age," it makes sense that Congress
adapts federal law to technological development far earlier than
the legislatures of some foreign countries. Some countries do
not value protecting intellectual property rights as much as the
United States does. Thus, it is possible that large-scale violations
of U.S. copyright could take place in a foreign country without
any prosecutable crime arising under that country's laws.
2. Extraterritorial Reach of Substantive Laws
A criminal can easily perpetrate an electronic crime against
a victim in a country without ever setting foot there. Applying
the domestic law of a country whose'citizen or resident is victim-
ized against a non-national perpetrator who has never even vis-
ited the country and may not even have known where his victim
was located raises questions about the extra-territorial reach of
domestic laws. International law can permit extraterritorial
reach of criminal law under an "effects test"-where the non-
national has engaged in extraterritorial conduct with the inten-
tion or the likelihood that it will have effects in the country
whose law is to be applied, or, possibly, where a crime is commit-
ted against a nation's citizens. 22 Whether extra-territorial reach
of a nation's substantive law is permitted can depend on the par-
ticular law at issue, the particular nation's jurisprudence, and
most importantly, the particular facts of the case.23 While some
countries, such as Denmark, Israel, and Sweden, 24 may prosecute
criminals for attacks on foreign victims, other countries may be
limited by their legal authority to do so, as Argentina was in the
Ardita case.25
3. Dual Criminality
When international legal assistance, such as extradition, is
sought, it is not necessarily sufficient that a victim country's laws
criminalize the conduct at issue, even if they are capable of ex-
tra-territorial application. Rather, it is frequently necessary for
22. See Henry H. Perritt, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REv. 1, 51-54 (1996).
23. For example, the United Kingdom's computer misuse act provides for broad
jurisdiction over crimes that take place on computer networks in the United Kingdom.
Computer Misuse Act, 1990, ch. 18, §§ 4-9 (Eng.).
24. See supra text accompanying notes 4, 8, 10, & 11.
25. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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the investigation that the substantive law of the other country
where investigative support is sought criminalizes the conduct at
issue in their own laws. Such parallelism is called "dual criminal-
ity" (or "double criminality"). Unless the dual criminality re-
quirement is fulfilled, a nation may be unwilling to extradite an
individual to the victim country if the act was not a crime domes-
tically, or may be unwilling to execute searches or to take other
investigative steps essential to effective law enforcement.
For example, until recently, computer crime has not re-
ceived the emphasis that other international crimes have engen-
dered. Even now, not all affected nations recognize the threat
that computer crime poses to public safety or the need for inter-
national cooperation to respond effectively to the problem.
Consequently, many countries have weak laws, or no laws,
against computer hacking, and they may decline to assist other
countries on the basis of lack of dual criminality.26
4. Variation Among Substantive Laws
Even if relevant substantive laws have been enacted in all of
the jurisdictions where a person perpetrates electronic crime,
the precise scope and application of those laws can be as com-
plex as the underlying technology. Since the substantive laws
are sure to vary, the "dual criminality" requirement discussed
above is not necessarily satisfied by dual enactment of relevant
criminal provisions. Those laws must incorporate the, precise
crime particularly at issue. For example, even if two countries
have criminal copyright infringement laws, copyright infringe-
ment without a commercial motive may be a crime in one coun-
try27 but not in another.
The complexity and rapid development of technology can
give rise to complex or evolving laws that govern electronic
crimes. For example, the primary U.S. computer crime statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1030, has undergone six revisions since it was en-
acted in 1984.28 The statute now embodies a specific set of U.S.
26. See Scott Charney & Kent Alexander, Computer Crime, 45 EMORY LJ. 931, 949
(1996).
27. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2) (Supp. 1997).
28. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190. The statute was amended in 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213; 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4404; 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 502; 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4831, 4910, 4925; 1994, Pub.
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concerns.29 Electronic crime statutes from various countries are,
of course, subject to their own evolution. Consequently, it is
predictable that such laws will differ in their scope.
5. Conflicts Among Substantive Laws
Substantive criminal law may actually conflict between vari-
ous countries. What is criminal activity in one country may be
specifically protected in another. While such differences arise
without the involvement of computers, the often-recognized ten-
dency of computer networks to make the world seem "smaller"
can exacerbate these differences and bring them into conflict.
One example of this dilemma arises with regard to so-called
"hate speech." Such speech is banned in many countries, partic-
ularly in Europe. Yet, the same hate speech in many instances is
not only not criminal in the United States, but it is protected by
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.31 Thus, for the
United States, law enforcement cooperation with other coun-
tries' investigations of hate speech cases can raise constitutional
concerns.
3 2
B. Procedural Law
Investigators in computer crime cases rely heavily on com-
munications providers to provide information regarding both
computer connections and content. This information is often
provided 'nly in response to court orders issued pursuant to es-
L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2097-2099; and 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3491,
3508.
29. See, e.g., Charney & Alexander, supra note 26, at 931-50.
30. For example, Malaysia recently enacted a substantive computer crime law that
has been praised as a testament to both "the danger posed by those who use high tech-
nology as a tool and a target of crime" and "the seriousness with which the Malaysian
government is taking this threat," but it may be in need of "fine-tuning." Donna L.
Beatty, Comment, Malaysia's "Computer Crimes Act 1997" Gets Tough on Cybercrime but Fails
To Advance the Development of Cyberlaws, 7 PAc. RIM L. & POL'YJ. 351, 375 (1998).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see, e.g., National Socialist Party of America v. Village of
Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (per curiam) (requiring procedural safeguards for state rule
that barred Nazis from displaying swastika).
32. See John T. Soma et al., Transnational Extradition for Computer Crimes: Are New
Treaties and Laws Needed?, 34 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 317, 343-45 (1997) (describing extradi-
tion of U.S. citizen Gary Lauck from Denmark to Germany for violating German anti-
Nazi criminal laws by "distributing illegal propaganda and Nazi symbols, incitement,
encouraging racial hatred and belonging to a criminal group" (quoting American Neo-
Nazi Arrested in Europe, CHI. TPiB., Mar. 24, 1995, at 3)).
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tablished criminal procedures. Such court orders can give law
enforcement the ability to search stored data, to access elec-
tronic mail, to trace the source and destination of communica-
tions, and to intercept communications in real time. Procedures
to obtain information, and procedural safeguards to restrict ac-
cess to information, are not available in computer cases in some
countries, and such processes may vary from country to coun-
try.33 On the other hand, procedures to obtain information do-
mestically may incidentally result in transborder searches with
international implications. One final procedural concern is that
the availability of a means, such as extradition, to obtain a mean-
ingful remedy may not be a real possibility.
1. Absence of Procedural Laws
A detailed framework of procedural laws can be valuable to
investigations, create powers and limits, and provide clear gui-
dance for collection of evidence by law enforcement agents. In
addition, they can ensure for the public both an appropriate
level of protection against unwarranted government intrusion
and an expectation of regularity in government action. For ex-
ample, the United States has a relatively detailed statutory
scheme governing law enforcement access to stored wire and
electronic communications.34 This complicated statute provides
direct guidance in investigations relating to any crimes where
such data is stored in the hands of third parties. Many other
countries do not have such a detailed framework or statement of
legislative intent.
One valuable subsection of the United States' statute pro-
vides for preservation of data, upon government request, until
the government obtains appropriate process for access to that
data. 5 This ability to freeze data is essential to law enforcement
in investigating many computer crime cases domestically. Yet,
most other countries have no such ability to preserve data upon
request pending issuance of process.
Another important procedural issue that many countries
33. Justice Frankfurter once observed that "[t] he history of liberty has largely been
the history of observance of procedural safeguards." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 347 (1943). A forward-looking Justice Frankfurter might suggest that the future of
liberty will be the future of the observance of procedural safeguards in computer cases.
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
35. See id. § 2703(f).
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have begun to address arises from the increased use of encryp-
tion products. The widespread use of strong encryption raises
the possibility of limiting the ability of the law enforcement to
protect public safety by collecting evidence as part of a legally
authorized search or surveillance. International efforts regard-
ing encryption policies are discussed below. 36
2. Variation of Procedural Laws
The differences ,in national procedural laws can substan-
tially impede investigation of a computer crime case. These dif-
ferences arise due to differences in national policy or history,
and idiosyncrasies related to the history of the' laws governing
procedure, among other reasons. For example, whereas certain
evidence or certifications may be necessary in one country to ob-
tain an order to trace a telephone call, entirely different show-
ings may be required in another country.3 7 Obtaining the neces-
sary information to procure a foreign court order to trace a
transmission may be a daunting task if domestic authorities do
not know what information will be needed in a foreign court.
3. Conflict of Procedural Laws
The variation among procedural laws can be exacerbated by
direct conflicts among the procedural laws of different coun-
tries. This problem is best exemplified by the scenario
presented in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Bank of
Nova Scotia), where a Canadian bank was held in civil contempt
for failing to comply with an order enforcing a grand jury sub-
poena duces tecum notwithstanding the fact that compliance
with the subpoena would have required the bank to violate a
Bahamian bank secrecy rule.3 8 As more companies take advan-
tage of computer networks to operate internationally, those
companies increasingly become subject to the laws of multiple
nations. As more investigations of crime committed over those
networks are conducted-and as the laws regulating privacy of
electronic data evolve-more conflicts are sure to arise.
Such conflicts could be of constitutional moment. For ex-
36. See Part III.C.
37. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (1§94).
38. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia), 691 F.2d
1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983).
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ample, the laws of some countries might provide a process for
compelled oral production of an unrecorded password that can
be used to decrypt data. In the United States, however, such
compulsion may implicate the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination.3 ' Therefore, compulsion of an unre-
corded password may not be a reliable process for U.S. law en-
forcement to access plaintext of encrypted data, while other
countries may safely presume the legality of such compulsion
when designing their procedures.
4. Transborder Searches
Procedures to obtain information domestically may inciden-
tally have international implications. For example, a search of
computer data on a domestic branch of a foreign corporation
may be authorized pursuant to a search warrant. Upon execut-
ing the search, however, the law enforcement officers may dis-
cover that the data is actually stored on a file server in the home
country of the corporate headquarters (or some other country).
The foreign search might also take place without the officers'
recognizing that the data is stored abroad. Either way, investiga-
tions of international electronic crime can give rise to unusual
questions of national sovereignty without a law enforcement
agent's ever leaving his or her home country's soil. It may be
legitimate and important for law enforcement to be allowed to
conduct a remote search of computers in a foreign country. At
present, there is no way to know how often such searches take
place, and the laws governing them are patchy and conflicting.
These issues are discussed further below, in relation to the work
of the G-8.4°
5. Remedy Issues
An investigation that uncovers substantial crime in a "victim
country" and successfully identifies a perpetrator in a foreign
country may nevertheless be subject to certain limits. For exam-
ple, a home country may be unwilling or unable to extradite its
national for many crimes, particularly since there is substantial
39. Philip R. Reitinger, Compelled Production of Plaintext and Keys, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 171, 203-05 (1996).
40. See Part III.A. The G-8 is made up of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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variation regarding enforcement and punishment of electronic
crimes.4 1 Even if a country is willing to extradite a criminal, it
can extradite him or her to only one country at a time. This is
problematic since a criminal in cyberspace could have commit-
ted crimes in many countries without leaving his or her home
country.
As an alternative to extradition, a home country may have
the option of prosecuting the perpetrator. This process, how-
ever, may not, particularly in a criminal case, vindicate the rights
of the victim country to prosecute and punish the wrongdoer.
Victim countries have legitimate interests to prosecute crimes
against the State, crimes that take place within their borders, and
crimes upon their citizens. Yet, a home country may not be em-
powered to prosecute wholly foreign, albeit related, crimes.
Moreover, the home country may not be inclined to devote the
same commitment of time and resources to that prosecution as
the victim country would have. Indeed, if the home country can
identify no crime actually committed by the wrongdoer in his or
her own country, it may not be willing or able to prosecute him
or her at all.4 2
C. Operational Issues
In addition to the formal concerns related to substantive
laws and procedural laws, international computer crime investi-
gations are hampered by a variety of operational issues. Among
these concerns are expertise and coordination, communication,
and timeliness.
Each of these aggravates the others. The time spent finding
and informing the technically literate law enforcement person-
nel in a foreign country who are authorized to address the crime
under investigation makes it more difficult for law enforcement
to combat crime quickly. The technical nature of the subject
heightens the potential for problems arising because of lan-
guage barriers. And those language barriers can further slow law
enforcement response to computer crime. Indeed, differences
in language, culture, and national interests create situations ripe
for misunderstandings to arise. For all of these reasons, opera-
41. See Soma et al., supra note 32, at 333, 369 (observing that extradition is as
much product of diplomacy and foreign relations as it is mechanism created by treaty).
42. For a fuller discussion of closely related issues, see Part II.A.2.
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tional issues are among the most intractable that arise in the
course of an international computer crime case.
1. Expertise and Coordination
Electronic crime investigations require specialized training
and experience on the part of law enforcement agents and pros-
ecutors, as well as substantial computer equipment and re-
sources. In the United States and in numerous other developed
countries, the need for such training and resources has been rec-
ognized for some time.4 3 Elsewhere, comparatively fewer law en-
forcement agents and prosecutors are trained to address such
crimes. 41 In certain cases, it may be crucial to find the law en-
forcement personnel in another country who have been trained
or who have experience in computer cases. Without well-devel-
oped coordination, this task can be difficult.
2. Communication
Communication is essential to cooperative electronic crime
investigations. Law enforcement agents, however, can be
stymied by language barriers and time differences that do not
necessarily deter criminals in cyberspace. The common lan-
guage of the Internet is English (and, to a lesser extent, Unix),
and networked computers are often in operation twenty-four
hours a day, seven days a week. With the Internet, instantaneous
access can be achieved with ease regardless of the target com-
puter's locale. Thus, a criminal from an English-speaking coun-
try could easily commit a crime on a victim in a Spanish-speak-
43. For example, at the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), data forensics
(i.e., extracting information from computers) is coordinated by the Computer Analysis
and Response Team ("CART"), which is headquartered in Washington, with trained
agents in offices nationwide. Similarly, for computer intrusion cases, FBI efforts are
coordinated by the National Infrastructure Protection Center ("NIPC"). See <http://
www.nipc.gov> (visited Apr. 14, 1999). On the prosecution side, these efforts are coor-
dinated in Washington D.C. by the Department ofJustice's Computer Crime and Intel-
lectual Property Section ("CCIPS") and throughout the country by Assistant United
States Attorneys designated as Computer-Telecommunications Coordinators ("CTCs").
See <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime> (visited Apr. 14, 1999).
44. Law enforcement personnel have sometimes been criticized for being insuffi-
ciently attentive to computer crime. See Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care
About Computer Crime, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465, 489 (1997). While the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice has been actively working in this area since the 1991 Computer Crime
Initiative, increasing levels of computer crime will require even more training and re-
sources. Id. at 493-94.
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ing, Chinese-speaking, or Hebrew-speaking country (or vice-
versa) located on the other side of the world.45 For law enforce-
ment agents to respond to such an attack effectively would re-
quire communication among people of two or more different
languages at odd hours. Many countries are not yet well-
equipped to meet this challenge.
3. Timeliness
To say that an electronic criminal can commit crimes
around the world in the time that it takes to blink an eye is not
an exaggeration. Law enforcement must attempt to respond
promptly. Indeed, criminals in cyberspace can commit multiple
crimes all over the world simultaneously. Yet, computer logs are
often routinely erased within a week on many systems or are
never kept at all.
In traditional physical-world crimes, law enforcement is not
often asked to respond to a public safety threat of such exigency.
Indeed, one commentator has observed that computer crime re-
quires law enforcement to be coordinated at a speed and to a
degree never before maintained "[o]r even envisione[d] .'46
Law enforcement specialists are not necessarily available twenty-
four hours a day. Moreover, legal requirements, such as those
for the issuance of a search warrant, and law enforcement poli-
cies are not designed to galvanize an immediate law enforce-
ment investigation. Investigations of international cases, which
can sometimes move at the speed of the slowest country, are par-
ticularly prone to delay.
III. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT EFFORTS TO ADDRESS
INTERNATIONAL ELECTRONIC CRIME CONCERNS
Both individual nations and multinational organizations
have been actively addressing the international electronic crime
concerns outlined above.4" The Justice Department has pursued
45. Of course, if the files on a computer are maintained in a language other than
English, that language barrier may act as a deterrent to foreign attackers who would like
access to the contents of those files.
46. Stephen P. Heymann, Legislating Computer Crime, 34 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 373, 390
(1997).
47. Commentators have long observed that countries "must... foster interna-
tional cooperation." Steve Shackelford, Computer-Related Crime: An International Problem
in Need of an International Solution, 27 TEX. INI'L L.J. 479, 503 (1992).
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formal multilateral initiatives in many fora, such as the G-8, the
Council of Europe (or "COE"), and the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (or "OECD"). The Jus-
tice Department efforts through these formal processes are de-
scribed in detail below.4"
Important international efforts have taken place in other
fora, such as at the United Nations.49 In fact, the United Nations
is planning to increase awareness of electronic crime issues by
sponsoring a workshop on "Crimes Related to the Computer
Network" at the Tenth United Congress on Crime Prevention
and the Treatment of Offenders scheduled to be held in Vienna
in April 2000.50 At the request of the Centre for International
Crime Prevention in Vienna, the United Nations Asia Far East-
ern Institute ("UNAFEI") assumed responsibility for coordinat-
ing the workshop. In October 1998, UNAFEI hosted an experts
meeting in Fuchu, Tokyo to begin preparations for this work-
shop. The group of experts, including representatives from Aus-
tralia, Canada, India, the Netherlands, Japan, Korea, South Af-
rica, and the United States, is planning a workshop program that
will demonstrate the legal and technical difficulties of tracking
criminal activities over computer networks, as well as the
problems associated with searching and seizing evidence stored
on computer networks. The Department ofJustice has attended
planning meetings on behalf of the United States in this effort.
48. Many commentators have discussed the ability of nation-states to "regulate"
cyberspace and their likelihood to do so. See, e.g., Edelstein, supra note 14, at 286
(describing international convention as "the ultimate solution"); see also Hogan, supra
note 14, at 852 (describing international convention on Internet gambling as "undoubt-
edly... the most appealing solution" and favorably citing conventions of World Intel-
lectual Property Organization ("WIPO") dealing with proprietary rights). One com-
mentator has noted that it can be useful "to think of the Internet less as a place and
more as a regime of transnational norms and rules (a logical counterpart to transna-
tional law) that regulates international interactions between individuals." Timothy S.
Wu, Note, Cyberspace Sovereignty? The Internet and the International System, 10 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 647, 663 (1997).
49. For example, the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders adopted a resolution in 1990, U.N. Secretariat, Report
of the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment
of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 140, U.N. Sales No. E.91.IV.2
(1991), and the United Nations published a Manual on the Prevention and Control of
Computer-Related Crime in 1994, U.N. Ctr. for Soc. Dev. & Humanitarian Aff., U.N.
Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer Related Crime, U.N. Doc. ST/
ESA/SER.M/43-44, U.N. Sales No. E.94.IV.5 (1994).
50. See United Nations General Assembly resolution 1997/52 of December 1997.
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In addition to these multilateral processes, U.S. law enforce-
ment has actively developed the informal relationships that are
essential to effective cooperation and that help breathe life into
the formal arrangements. One of the aims of a March 1997 In-
ternational Computer Crime Conference in New York City,
hosted by the Computer Crime Squad in the FBI's New York
field office, was to make possible international informal con-
tacts.51 Twenty-nine foreign nations sent representatives to the
conference, which provided an overview of computer crime is-
sues and cases and allowed countries to discuss their various ap-
proaches to computer crimes. U.S. law enforcement staff have
established relationships with numerous knowledgeable foreign
law enforcement personnel.
A. G-8
In October 1996, the G-8's Senior Experts' Group on Trans-
national Organized Crime, meeting in Lyon, France, adopted a
proposal to create a subgroup to focus specifically on interna-
tional electronic crime issues. This subgroup met for the first
time in Chantilly, Virginia, in January 1997. The G-8 is an excel-
lent forum for such an effort because it is small enough to make
meaningful discussions possible while including representatives
from some of the most technologically advanced nations that are
most susceptible to electronic crimes.
During 1997, the United States held the presidency of the
G-8 and hosted the summit of G-8 heads of state in Denver, Colo-
rado, in June of that year. At that summit, the heads of state
jointly asked their countries to work together in addressing elec-
tronic crime issues. In an effort to address that request, the At-
torney General of the United States convened a meeting of Jus-
tice and Interior Ministers from the countries that make up the
G-8 in Washington, on December 9-10, 1997. One outgrowth of
the meeting and of the Subgroup's work was that the Ministers
adopted a communiqu6 that contained ten principles and ten
action items relating to high-tech crime.52
The Subgroup worked on numerous issues in 1998, focus-
ing in particular on three items. The first of these items was
51. See, e.g., Pat Milton, FBIDirector Calls for Effort to Fight Growing Danger of Computer
Crime, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 4, 1997.
52. The communiqu6 can be found in Appendix A.
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transborder computer searches in networked systems by law en-
forcement.53 Rapid transborder searches may be crucial to pro-
tect public safety, privacy, and human rights in stalking, sexual
abuse, kidnapping, extortion, terrorism, and other cases. (The
fact that a communication is stored in another country has no
necessary connection to whether one person is physically close
enough to do another harm). Moreover, it is frequently difficult
or impossible for law enforcement, acting with proper domestic
legal authority, to discern when it has crossed a country's border
electronically. Yet to permit such searches on a wholesale basis
would undermine those same values of' public safety, privacy,
and human rights. The Subgroup has been discussing all pos-
sibilities, including prohibiting, permitting, or regularizing such
searches (such as by restricting them to use in controlled and
limited circumstances).
Second, the Subgroup fully implemented a network among
the G-8 countries of twenty-four hour emergency contacts for in-
vestigating crimes involving electronic evidence, which would in-
clude hacker attacks on the nation's critical infrastructure. That
network was used repeatedly in 1998 and investigators are be-
coming familiar with its use. The Subgroup is in the process of
inviting other countries to join this emergency network and an-
ticipates its continual expansion.
Third, the Subgroup spent a substantial amount of time
talking with telecommunications and Internet service providers
to ensure that the governments understand industry trends and
provider needs and aims. As an initial response to those discus-
sions, the Subgroup expects to set up an emergency contact net-
work between government and industry. Also, it is standardizing
the forms by which governments request information from prov-
iders. This government-industry liaison will continue.
In November 1998, the United States organized and hosted
the first G-8 training conference. This five-day conference, well-
received by the attendees, brought together high-tech investiga-
tors from all of the G-8 countries and from the European Union
and Council of Europe to discuss, in technical terms, opera-
tional aspects of investigating cases in an electronic environ-
ment. Because of the conference's success, two technical train-
ing sessions will be held in 1999.
53. See Part II.B.4.
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B. Council of Europe
A second significant multilateral effort involves the Council
of Europe, which has long been an active forum for computer
crime issues. In 1989, the COE issued a seminal paper on the
substantive law of computer-related crime.54 This document
contained a "Minimal List" describing conduct that COE coun-
tries should criminalize and an "Optional List," which included
activity that some countries might wish to criminalize. The re-
sult of this -effort was a spate, of new computer crime laws
throughout Europe.
Following this effort, the COE convened another group of
experts to address procedural issues raised by crimes against in-
formation technology. The United States is not a member of the
Council of Europe, but participated as an official observer and
was represented by the Justice Department. This meeting re-
sulted in sweeping procedural recommendations on such mat-
ters as tracing the source and destination of communications,
transborder searches in networked systems, mutual legal assist-
ance, and other topics, all geared to providing swifter interna-
tional cooperation in high-tech cases."
In early 1997, the Council of Europe's European Commit-
tee on Crime Problems ("CDPC") established a committee to
continue its study of high-tech issues. Under the terms of refer-
ence (i.e., the charter), the committee has been charged with
drafting a convention focusing on cyberspace offenses, trans-
border searches, international cooperation, and other issues.The committee's initial meeting was held in April 1997.
Member countries and various observer countries, including the
United States, participated in the sessions. The Justice Depart-
ment represented the United States in this committee as well.
Some of the subjects being studied by the committee are acts
against the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of informa-
tion systems that should be criminalized by all signatories; juris-
diction; a limited intellectual property section; a limited child
pornography section; transborder searches of networked com-
puters; more rapid exchange of telecommunications source and
54. Council of Europe, Computer-Related Crime, Recommendation No. R (89) 9.
55. Council of Europe, Criminal Procedural Law in Information Technology
Cases, Recommendation No. R (95) 13. Recommendation No. (95) 13 can be found in
Appendix B.
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destination information; undercover operations; wiretaps; a net-
work of emergency contacts; and mutual legal assistance. The
committee is expected to complete its draft of a "Cyber-Crime
Convention" by the end of 1999.
This Cyber-Crime Convention will have the full effect of a
multilateral treaty among the ratifying nations and, as such, will
have the force of law. There is a large set of potential signatory
nations. First, as with any Council of Europe Convention, all of
the member European nations may sign on to the Convention.
Moreover, the observer states that have participated in drafting
the Cyber-Crime Convention, such as Canada, Japan, and the
United States, may also sign on.6 Eventually, even non-observ-
ing nations may be permitted by the Council of Europe to enter
into the Cyber-Crime Convention. With such a large pool of po-
tential signatory nations, the reciprocal ramifications of the
Cyber-Crime Convention must be carefully considered before
they are adopted.
C. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
The OECD has long been in the forefront of developing
policy approaches to address cybercrime. The OECD initiated
the first multinational effort to address the flaws in existing crim-
inal laws with regard to computer crimes. In 1986, the OECD
suggested a common approach based on an analysis of the sub-
stantive law of member states.5 7 In 1992, the OECD developed
Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems. 58
More recently, the OECD entered the highly contested area
of cryptography policy. This policy area is of great interest to the
Justice Department. The Justice Department believes that the
use of strong cryptography is critical to the development of the
Global Information Infrastructure ("GII"). Communications
and data must be protected "both in transit and in storage" if the
GII is to be used for personal communications, financial transac-
tions, medical care, the development of new intellectual prop-
erty, and other applications. The widespread use of unrecover-
56. For the United States, entering into the Cyber-Crime Convention would re-
quire Senate ratification.
57. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Dev., Computer-Related Crime:
Analysis of Legal Policy (1986).
58. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Dev., Guidelines for the Se-
curity of Information Systems (1992).
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able encryption by criminals, however, poses a serious risk to
public safety. Encryption may be used by terrorist groups, drug
cartels, foreign intelligence agents, and other criminals to secure
their data and communications, thus nullifying the effectiveness
of search warrants and wiretap orders. The Justice Department's
goal "and the Clinton Administration's policy" is to promote the
development and use of strong encryption that enhances the pri-
vacy of communications and stored data, while also preserving
law enforcement's current ability to gain access to evidence as
part of a legally authorized search or surveillance. 9
The export of encryption products is currently regulated
under U.S. law.6" The United States does not control the domes-
tic use of encryption products. Because of the growth of interna-
tional markets for computer software, and the ease with which
computer software can be disseminated, it is important for coun-
tries concerned about the widespread use of unrecoverable en-
cryption to coordinate national policies. Indeed, export con-
trols of various nations have been coordinated internationally
since World War II through an agreement that is now known as
the Wassenaar Agreement.6"
The OECD began work on cryptography policy formally in
early 1996. The effort was taken up under the auspices of the
OECD's Information, Computers, and Communication Policy,
which established an Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Cryptography
Policy Guidelines ("Ad Hoc Group"). This group was charged
with drafting Guidelines for Cryptography Policy ("Guidelines")
to identify the issues that should be taken into consideration in
the formulation of cryptography policies at the national and in-
ternational levels. The Ad Hoc Group was chaired by a member
of the Attorney General's Department of Australia. Since the
59. See Preface, Department of Justice Frequently Asked Questions ("FAQ") on Encryption
Policy (visited Apr. 14, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
crypto.html#1Va> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
60. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 740, 742, 743, 772, 774 (1999); see also Bureau of Export Ad-
ministration, Department of Commerce, Encryption Items, 63 Fed. Reg. 72,156 (Dec. 31,
1998) (Interim Rule).
61. The Wassenaar Agreement is subject to re-negotiation and amendment. Most
recently, agreement was reached on encryption standards under the Wassenaar frame-
work in December 1998 at a meeting in Vienna. See, e.g., Elizabeth Corcoran, Encryption
Curbs Backed by 33 Nations, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1998, at D1;John Markoff, International
Group Reaches Agreement on Encryption, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1998, at C3.
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OECD is a consensus-based organization, all member nations
were invited to participate.
With an active delegation from the United States, including
representatives from the Justice Department, the Guidelines
were completed in December 1996. These Guidelines included
eight principles for member nations to take into account when
developing their own cryptography policies. These principles
are as follows:
1. Trust in Cryptographic Methods: Cryptographic meth-
ods should be trustworthy in order to generate confi-
dence in the use of information and communications sys-
tems.
2. Choice of Cryptographic Methods: Users should have a
right to choose any cryptographic method, subject to ap-
plicable law.
3. Market Driven Development of Cryptographic Methods:
Cryptographic methods should be developed in response
to the needs, demands, and responsibilities of individu-
als, businesses, and governments.
4. Standards for Cryptographic Methods: Technical stan-
dards, criteria, and protocols for cryptographic methods
should be developed and promulgated at the national
and international level.
5. Protection of Privacy and Personal Data: The fundamen-
tal rights of individuals to privacy, including secrecy of
communications and protection of personal data, should
be respected in national cryptography policies and in the
implementation and use of cryptographic methods.
6. Lawful Access: National cryptography policies may allow
lawful access to plaintext, or cryptographic keys, of en-
crypted data. These policies must respect the other prin-
ciples contained in the guidelines to the greatest extent
possible.
7. Liability: Whether established by contract or legislation,
the liability of individuals and entities that offer crypto-
graphic services or hold or access cryptographic keys
should be clearly stated.
8. International Cooperation: Governments should coop-
erate to coordinate cryptography policies. As part of this
effort, governments should remove, or avoid creating in
CRIMES IN CYBERSPA CE
the name of cryptography policy, unjustified obstacles to
trade.
On March 27, 1997, the OECD adopted the Guidelines as a
Recommendation of the Council of the OECD.62 As countries
formulate their cryptography policies, the OECD Guidelines
have been carefully analyzed and seriously considered.63
CONCLUSION
While the development of cyberspace offers much promise
for international interaction and growth, it also facilitates the
commission of international crime. By identifying the critical in-
ternational issues relating to crimes in cyberspace and address-
ing them, countries can try to maintain the same security for
their citizens in the information society that they have tradition-
ally enjoyed.
62. The Guidelines adopted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development can be found in Appendix C.
63. See, e.g., Stewart A. Baker, Decoding OECD Guidelines for Cyptography Policy, 31
INT'L L. 729, passim (1997); Wayne Madsen et al., Cryptography and Liberty: An Interna-
tional Survey of Encryption Policy, JOHN MARSHALJ. COMP. & INFO. L. 475, 522-24 (1998)
(discussing OECD Guidelines).
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APPENDIX A
MEETING OF JUSTICE AND INTERIOR MINISTERS -OF THE EIGHT
DECEMBER 9-10, 1997
COMMUNIQUE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
DECEMBER 10, 1997
At the Summit of The Eight in Denver, our Heads of State
and Government directed us to intensify our efforts to imple-
ment the forty recommendations of the Summit of Lyon, in or-
der to combat transnational organized criminal activity posing
an ever-greater threat to the individual and collective security of
our citizens. With increased international movement by organ-
ized criminal groups and their use of new global communica-
tions technologies, the protection of our citizens' safety, tradi-
tionally a domestic concern, requires unprecedented levels of in-
ternational cooperation. Our responsibility is not only to react
to the activities of organized criminal groups, but also to antici-
pate and prevent their growth.
We meet today at the Ministerial level to agree upon a pro-
gram of specific actions designed to accomplish two critical
tasks: enhancing our abilities to investigate and prosecute high-
tech crimes and strengthening international legal regimes for
extradition and mutual legal assistance to ensure that no crimi-
nal receives safe haven anywhere in the world.
With regard to high-tech crime, we must start by recogniz-
ing that new computer and telecommunications technologies of-
fer unprecedented opportunities for global communication. As
nations become increasingly reliant upon these technologies, in-
cluding wireless communications, their exploitation by high-tech
criminals poses an ever-greater threat to public safety. This
threat takes at least two forms. First, sophisticated criminals are
targeting computer and telecommunications systems to obtain
or alter valuable information without authority and may attempt
to disrupt critical commercial and public systems. Second,
criminals, including members of organized crime groups and
terrorists, are using these new technologies to facilitate tradi-
tional offenses. Clearly, the misuse of information systems in
these ways poses a serious threat to public safety.
National laws apply to the Internet and other global net-
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works. But while the enactment and enforcement of criminal
laws have been, and remain, a national responsibility, the nature
of modern communications networks makes it impossible for
any country acting alone to address this emerging high-tech
crime problem. A common approach addressing the unique,
borderless nature of global networks is needed and must have
several distinct components.
Each country must have in place domestic laws that ensure
that the improper use of computer networks is appropriately
criminalized and that evidence of high-tech crimes can be pre-
served and collected in a timely fashion. Countries must also
ensure that a sufficient number of technically-literate, appropri-
ately-equipped personnel are available to address high-tech
crimes.
Such domestic efforts must be complemented by a new level
of international cooperation, especially since global networks fa-
cilitate the commission of transborder offenses. Therefore, con-
sistent with principles of sovereignty and the protection of
human rights, democratic freedoms and privacy, nations must
be able to collect and exchange information internationally, es-
pecially within the short time frame so often required when in-
vestigating international high-tech crimes.
The development of effective solutions will also require un-
precedented cooperation between government and industry. It
is the industrial sector that is designing, deploying and maintain-
ing these global networks and is primarily responsible for the
development of technical standards. Thus, it is incumbent on
the industrial sector to play its part in developing and distribut-
ing secure systems that, when accompanied by adherence to
good computer and personnel security practices, serve to pre-
vent computer abuse. Such systems should also be designed to
help detect computer abuse, preserve electronic evidence, and
assist in ascertaining the location and identity of criminals.
To meet the challenges of the information age, we have
agreed to ten Principles and a ten-point Action Plan, annexed to
this Communiqu& We direct our experts to promote these Prin-
ciples throughout the international community and take forward
the Action Plan without delay.
Another core area of concern is mutual legal assistance and
extradition. We reiterate the fundamental importance of either
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returning our nationals for trial in the country in which the
crime was committed or, where that is not possible, conducting
effective domestic prosecutions in lieu thereof. Those of us that
conduct domestic prosecution of our nationals in lieu of extradi-
tion agree to pursue such prosecutions with the same commit-
ment of time, personnel and financial resources as are devoted
to the prosecution of serious crimes committed within our own
territory.
We recognize that the need for enhanced cooperation in
extradition and mutual assistance is particularly acute with re-
spect to high-tech crime and other areas of emerging signifi-
cance. We commit to remove impediments in existing coopera-
tion regimes by such means as approaching issues of dual crimi-
nality with flexibility, and we will ensure that serious computer
abuses have criminal penalties sufficient to make them extradita-
ble. We also commit to enhance coordination among States in
multi-jurisdictional cases, so as to minimize conflicts and dupli-
cations in investigations and prosecutions, consult as to where
best to prosecute, and allocate responsibility for gathering and
sharing evidence.
We are also convinced that we must further enhance our
abilities to obtain testimony from witnesses located abroad for
use in criminal proceedings in our States. We agree to intensify
our efforts to use video-link technology as a means of securing
testimony or statements from a witness located abroad. Where
possible, we will locate or establish facilities with technical video-
link capability, allow the use of video-link as a form of mutual
assistance to other States and provide for the punishment of per-
jury committed during video-link transmissions.
We emphasize that these agreed-upon cooperation meas-
ures can be used by all countries to enhance international coop-
eration in combating transnational organized crime. Our ex-
perts will review annually our implementation at the national
level of these international legal cooperation measures. We also
urge all States to adopt the recommendations of the Summit of
Lyon pertaining to international legal cooperation and the best
practices agreed upon by our experts to implement them.
We direct our experts to focus their future work on the fol-
lowing areas: Continued examination of the use of video-link
technology and confiscation and sharing of assets obtained
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through criminal activity; identification of additional measures
that would enhance cooperation in areas of emerging signifi-
cance; ways to further promote acceptance by other members of
the international community of the principles set forth in the
above recommendations and practical actions; and coordination
among The Eight on the possible elaboration of a U.N. organ-
ized crime convention.
In addition to taking action on high-tech crime and mutual
legal assistance, we further direct our experts to pursue their
work in implementing comprehensive action against transna-
tional organized crime, as mandated by the Denver Summit.
Therefore, we welcome the continued efforts of our experts to
develop cooperative strategies and policies to combat major
transnational criminal organizations and to implement joint op-
erational projects to target such organizations and their criminal
activities. We will continue to work together to combat interna-
tional firearms trafficking and other forms of cross-border crime
and smuggling and to address the financial aspects of organized
crime.
In conclusion, we recognize the urgent need to make rapid
progress in these areas and will take the steps necessary to en-
sure protection from the physical and financial predation of
transnational organized crime. Our task is daunting, but we ex-
pect to report substantial progress in this endeavor to the Bir-
mingham Summit in May of 1998.
COMMUNIQUf ANNEX:
PRINCIPLES TO COMBAT HIGH-TECH CRIME
Statement of Principles
I. There must be no safe havens for those who abuse informa-
tion technologies.
II. Investigation and prosecution of international high-tech
crimes must be coordinated among all concerned States, regard-
less of where harm has occurred.
III. Law enforcement personnel must be trained and equipped
to address high-tech crimes.
IV. Legal systems must protect the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of data and systems from unauthorized impairment
and ensure that serious abuse is penalized.
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V. Legal systems should permit the preservation of and quick
access to electronic data, which are often critical to the success-
ful investigation of crime.
VI. Mutual assistance regimes must ensure the timely gathering
and exchange of evidence in cases involving international high-
tech crime.
VII. Transborder electronic access by law enforcement to pub-
licly available (open source) information does not require au-
thorization from the State where the data resides.
VIII. Forensic standards for retrieving and authenticating elec-
tronic data for use in criminal investigations and prosecutions
must be developed and employed.
IX. To the extent practicable, information and telecommunica-
tions systems should be designed to help prevent and detect net-
work abuse, and should also facilitate the tracing of criminals
and the collection of evidence.
X. Work in this area should be coordinated with the work of
other relevant international fora to ensure against duplication of
efforts.
ACTION PLAN
In support of these PRINCIPLES, we are directing our officials
to:
1. Use our established network of knowledgeable personnel to
ensure a timely, effective response to transnational high-tech
cases and designate a point-of-contact who is available on a
twenty-four hour basis.
2. Take appropriate steps to ensure that a sufficient number of
trained and equipped law enforcement personnel are allocated
to the task of combating high-tech crime and assisting law en-
forcement agencies of other States.
3. Review our legal systems to ensure that they appropriately
criminalize abuses of telecommunications and computer systems
and promote the investigation of high-tech crimes.
4. Consider issues raised by high-tech crimes, where relevant,
when negotiating mutual assistance agreements or arrange-
ments.
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5. Continue to examine and develop workable solutions regard-
ing: the preservation of evidence prior to the execution of a re-
quest for mutual assistance; transborder searches; and computer
searches of data where the location of that data is unknown.
6. Develop expedited procedures for obtaining traffic data from
all communications carriers in the chain of a communication
and to study ways to expedite the passing of this data interna-
tionally.
7. Work jointly with industry to ensure that new technologies
facilitate our effort to combat high-tech crime by preserving and
collecting critical evidence.
8. Ensure that we can, in urgent and appropriate cases, accept
and respond to mutual assistance requests relating to high-tech
crime by expedited but reliable means of communications, in-
cluding voice, fax, or e-mail, with written confirmation to follow
where required.
9. Encourage internationally-recognized standards-making bod-
ies in the fields of telecommunications and information technol-
ogies to continue providing the public and private sectors with
standards for reliable and secure telecommunications and data
processing technologies.
10. Develop and employ compatible forensic standards for re-
trieving and authenticating electronic data for use in criminal
investigations and prosecutions.
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APPENDIX B
RECOMMENDATION No. R (95) 13 OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINIS-
TERS TO MEMBER STATES CONCERNING PROBLEMS OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE LAW CONNECTED WITH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
(ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS ON 11 SEPTEMBER
1995 AT THE 543 MEETING OF THE MINISTERS' DEPUTIES)
The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of Article 15.b of
the Statute of the Council of Europe.
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve
a greater unity between its members;
Having regard to the unprecedented development of informa-
tion technology and its application in all sectors of modern soci-
ety;
Realizing that the development of electronic information sys-
tems will speed up the transformation of traditional society into
an information society by creating a new space for all types of
communications and relations;
Aware of the impact of information technology on the manner
in which society is organised and on how individuals communi-
cations and interrelate;
Conscious that an increasing part of economic and social rela-
tions will take place through or by use of electronic information
systems;
Concerned at the risk that electronic information systems and
electronic information may also be used for committing criminal
offenses;
Considering that evidence of criminal offenses may be stored
and transferred by these systems;
Noting that criminal procedure laws of members states often do
not yet provide for appropriate powers to search and collect evi-
dence in these systems in the course of criminal investigations;
Recalling that the lack of appropriate special powers may impair
investigating authorities in the proper fulfillment of their tasks
in the face of the ongoing development of information technol-
ogy;
Recognising the need to adopt the legitimate tools which investi-
gating authorities are afforded under criminal procedure laws
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the specific nature of investigations in electronic information
systems;
Concerned by the potential risk that member states may not be
able to render mutual legal assistance in an appropriate way
when requested to collect electronic evidence within their terri-
tory from electronic information systems;
Convinced of the necessity of strengthening international co-op-
eration and achieving a greater compatibility of criminal proce-
dural laws in this field;
Recalling Recommendation No. R (81) 20 of the Committee of
Ministers on the harmonisation of laws relating to the require-
ment of written proof and to the admissibility of reproductions
of documents and recordings on computers, Recommendation
No. R. (85) 10 on letters rogatory for the interception of tele-
communications, Recommendations No. R (87) 15 regulating
the use of personal data in the police state and Recommenda-
tions No. R (89) 9 on computer-relating crime,
Recommends the governments of member states:
i. when reviewing their internal legislation and practice, to be
guided by the principles appended to this recommendation; and
ii. to ensure publicity for these principles among those investi-
gating authorities and other professional bodies, in particular in
the field of information technology, which may have an interest
in their application.
APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDATION No R. (95) 13 CONCERNING
PROBLEMS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW CONNECTED WITH INFOR-
MATION TECHNOLOGY
I. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
1. The legal distinction between searching computers systems
and seizing data stored therein and intercepting data in the
course of transmission should be clearly delineated and applied.
2. Criminal procedure laws should permit investigating authori-
ties to search computer systems and seize data under similar con-
ditions as under traditional powers of search and seizure. The
person in charge of the system should be informed that the sys-
tem has been searched and of the kind of data that has been
seized. The legal remedies that are provided for in general
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against search and seizure should be equally applicable in case
of search in computer systems and in case of seizure of data
therein.
3. During execution of a search, investigating authorities should
have the power, subject to appropriate safeguards, to extend the
search of other computer systems within their jurisdiction which
are connected by means of a network and seize the data therein,
provided immediate action is required.
4. Where automatically processed data is functionally equivalent
to a traditional document, provisions in the criminal procedure
law relating to search and seizure of documents should apply
equally to it.
II. TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE
5. In view of the convergence of information technology and
telecommunications, law pertaining to technical surveillance for
the purpose of criminal investigations, such as interception of
telecommunications, should be reviewed and amended, where
necessary, to ensure their applicability.
6. The law should permit investigating authorities to avail them-
selves of all necessary technical measures that enable the collec-
tion of traffic data in the investigation of crimes.
7. When collected in the course of a criminal investigation and
in particular when obtained by means of intercepting telecom-
munications, data which is the object of legal protection and
processed by a computer system should be secured in an appro-
priate manner.
8. Criminal procedure laws should be reviewed with a view to
making possible the interception of telecommunications and the
collection of traffic data in the investigation of serious offenses
against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of telecom-
munications or computer systems.
III. OBLIGATIONS TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE INVESTIGATING
AUTHORITIES
9. Subject to legal privileges or protection, most legal systems
permit investigating authorities to order persons to hand over
objects under their control that are required to serve as evi-
dence. In a parallel fashion, provisions should be made for the
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power to order persons to submit any specified data under their
control in a computer system in the form required by the investi-
gating authority.
10. Subject to legal privileges or protection, investigating au-
thorities should have the power to order persons who have data
in a computer system under their control to provide all neces-
sary information to enable access to a computer system and the
data therein. Criminal procedure law should ensure that a simi-
lar order can be given to other persons who have knowledge
about the functioning of the computer system or measures ap-
plied to secure the data therein.
11. Specific obligations should be imposed on operators of pub-
lic and private networks that offer telecommunications services
to the public to avail themselves of all necessary technical meas-
ures that enable the interception of telecommunications by the
investigating authorities.
12. Specific obligations should be imposed on service providers
who offer telecommunications services to the public, either
through public or private networks, to provide information to
identify the user, when so ordered by the competent investigat-
ing authority.
IV. ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
13. The common need to collect, preserve, and present elec-
tronic evidence in ways that best ensure and reflect their integ-
rity and irrefutable authenticity, both for the purposes of domes-
tic prosecution and international co-operation, should be recog-
nized. Therefore, procedures and technical methods for
handling electronic evidence should be further developed, and
particularly in such a way as to ensure their compatibility be-
tween states. Criminal procedural law provisions on evidence re-
lating to tradition documents should similarly apply to data
stored in a computer system.
V. USE OF ENCRYPTION
14. Measures should be considered to minimise the negative ef-
fects of the use of cryptography on the investigation of criminal
offenses, without affecting its legitimate use more than is strictly
necessary.
1999] 1959
1960 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:1924
VI. RESEARCH, STATISTICS AND TRAINING
15. The risks involved in the development and application of in-
formation technology with regard to the commission of criminal
offenses should be assured continuously. In order to enable the
competent authorities to keep abreast of new phenomena in the
field of computer related offenses and to develop appropriate
counter-measures, the collection and analysis of data on these
offenses, including modus operandi and technical aspects,
should be furthered.
16. The establishment of specialised units for the investigation
of offenses, the combating of which requires special expertise in
information technology, should be considered. Training
programmes enabling criminal justice personnel to avail them-
selves of expertise in this field should be furthered.
VII. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
17. The power to extend a search to other computer systems
should also be applicable when the system is located in a foreign
jurisdiction, provided that immediate action is required. In or-
der to avoid possible violations of state sovereignty or interna-
tional law, an unambiguous legal basis for such extended search
and seizure should be established. Therefore, there is an urgent
need for negotiating international agreements as to how, when
and to what extent such search and seizure should be permitted.
18. Expedited and adequate procedures as well as a system of
liaison should be available according to which the investigating
authorities may request the foreign authorities to promptly col-
lect evidence. For that purpose the requested authorities should
be authorized to search a computer system and seize data with a
view to its subsequent transfer. The requested authorities
should also be authorized to provide trafficking data related to a
specific telecommunication, intercept a specific telecommunica-
tion or identify its source. For that purpose, the existing mutual
legal assistance instruments need to be supplemented.
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APPENDIX C
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING
GUIDELINES FOR CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY 27 MARCH 1997
THE COUNCIL, HAVING REGARD TO:
-the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development of 14 December 1960, in particular,
articles 1 b), 1 c), 3 a) and 5 b) thereof;
-the Recommendation of the Council concerning Guide-
lines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows
of Personal Data of 23 September 1980 [C(80) 58 (Final)];
-the Declaration on Transborder Data Flows adopted by
the Governments of OECD Member countries on 11 April 1985
[Annex to C(85)139];
-the Recommendation of the Council concerning Guide-
lines for the Security of Information Systems of 26-27 November
1992 [C(92) 188/FINAL];
-the Directive [95/46/EC] of the European Parliament
and of the Council of the European Union of 24 October 1995
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data;
-the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Con-
ventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies agreed
on 13 July 1996;
-the Regulation [(EC) 3381/94] and the Decision [94/
942/PESC] of the Council of the European Union of 19 Decem-
ber 1994 concerning the control of the export of dual-use goods;
-and the Recommendation [R(95)13] of the Council of
Europe of 11 September 1995 concerning problems of criminal
procedural law connected with information technology;
CONSIDERING:
-that national and global information infrastructures are
developing rapidly to provide a seamless network for world-wide
communications and access to data;
-that this emerging information and communications net-
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work is likely to have an important impact on economic develop-
ment and world trade;
-that the users of information technology must have trust
in the security of information and communications infrastruc-
tures, networks and systems; in the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of data on them; and in the ability to prove the origin
and receipt of data;
-that data is increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated
threats to its security, and ensuring the security of data through
legal, procedural and technical means is fundamentally impor-
tant in order for national and international information infra-
structures to reach their full potential;
RECOGNISING:
-that, as cryptography can be an effective tool for the se-
cure use of information technology by ensuring confidentiality,
integrity and availability of data and by providing authentication
and non-repudiation mechanisms for that data, it is an impor-
tant component of secure information and communications net-
works and systems;
-that cryptography has a variety of applications related to
the protection of privacy, intellectual property, business and fi-
nancial information, public safety and national security, and the
operation of electronic commerce, including secure anonymous
payments and transactions;
-that the failure to utilise cryptographic methods can ad-
versely affect the protection of privacy, intellectual property,
business and financial information, public safety and national se-
curity and the operation of electronic commerce because data
and communications may be inadequately protected from
unauthorised access, alteration, and improper use, and, there-
fore, users may not trust information and communications sys-
tems, networks and infrastructures;
-that the use" of cryptography to ensure integrity of data,
including authentication and non-repudiation mechanisms, is
distinct from its use to ensure confidentiality of data, and that
each of these uses presents different issues;
-that the quality of information protection afforded by
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cryptography depends not only on the selected technical means,
but also on good managerial, organisational and operational
procedures;
AND FURTHER RECOGNISING:
-that governments have wide-ranging responsibilities, sev-
eral of which are specifically implicated in the use of cryptogra-
phy, including protection of privacy and facilitating information
and communications systems security; encouraging economic
well-being by, in part, promoting commerce; maintaining public
safety; and enabling the enforcement of laws and the protection
of national security;
-that although there are legitimate governmental, com-
mercial and individual needs and uses for cryptography, it may
also be used by individuals or entities for illegal activities, which
can affect public safety, national security, the enforcement of
laws, business interests, consumer interests or privacy; therefore
governments, together with industry and the general public, are
challenged to develop balanced policies;
-that due to the inherently global nature of information
and communications networks, implementation of incompatible
national policies will not meet the needs of individuals, business
and governments and may create obstacles to economic co-oper-
ation and development; and, therefore, national policies may re-
quire international co-ordination;
-that this Recommendation of the Council does not affect
the sovereign rights of national governments and that the Guide-
lines contained in the Annex to this Recommendation are always
subject to the requirements of national law;
On the proposal of the Committee for Information, Computer
and Communications Policy;
RECOMMENDS THAT MEMBER COUNTRIES:
-establish new, or amend existing, policies, methods,
measures, practices and procedures to reflect and take into ac-
count the Principles concerning cryptography policy set forth in
the Guidelines contained in the Annex to this Recommendation
(hereinafter "the Guidelines"), which is an integral part hereof,
in so doing, also take into account the Recommendation of the
Council concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Pri-
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vacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data of 23 September
1980 [C(80)58(Final)] and the Recommendation of the Council
concerning Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems
of 26-27 November 1992 [C(92)188/FINAL];
-consult, co-ordinate and co-operate at the national and
international level in the implementation of the Guidelines;
-act on the need for practical and operational solutions in
the area of international cryptography policy by using the Guide-
lines as a basis for agreements on specific issues related to inter-
national cryptography policy;
-disseminate the Guidelines throughout the public and
private sectors to promote awareness of the issues and policies
related to cryptography;
-remove, or avoid creating in the name of cryptography
policy, unjustified obstacles to international trade and the devel-
opment of information and communications networks;
-state clearly and make publicly available, any national
controls imposed by governments relating to the use of cryptog-
raphy;
-review the Guidelines at least every five years, with a view
to improving international co-operation on issues relating to
cryptography policy.
ANNEX
GUIDELINES FOR CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY
I. AIMS
The Guidelines are intended:
-to promote the use of cryptography;
-to foster confidence in information and communications
infrastructures, networks and systems and the manner in which
they are used;
-to help ensure the security of data, and to protect privacy,
in national and global information and communications infra-
structures, networks and systems;
-to promote this use of cryptography without unduly je-
opardising public safety, law enforcement, and national security;
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-to raise awareness of the need for compatible cryptogra-
phy policies and laws, as well as the need for interoperable, port-
able and mobile cryptographic methods in national and global
information and communications networks;
-to assist decision-makers in the public and private sectors
in developing and implementing coherent national and interna-
tional policies, methods, measures, practices and procedures for
the effective use of cryptography;
-to promote co-operation between the public and private
sectors in the development and implementation of national and
international cryptography policies, methods, measures, prac-
tices and procedures;
-to facilitate international trade by promoting cost-effec-
tive, interoperable, portable and mobile cryptographic systems;
-to promote international co-operation among govern-
ments, business and research communities, and standards-mak-
ing bodies in achieving co-ordinated use of cryptographic meth-
ods.
II. SCOPE
The Guidelines are primarily aimed at governments, in terms of
the policy recommendations herein, but with anticipation that
they will be widely read and followed by both the private and
public sectors.
It is recognised that governments have separable and distinct re-
sponsibilities for the protection of information that requires se-
curity in the national interest; the Guidelines are not intended
for application in these matters.
III. DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of the Guidelines:
-"Authentication" means a function for establishing the va-
lidity of a claimed identity of a user, device or another entity in
an information or communications system.
-"Availability" means the property that data, information,
and information and communications systems are accessible and
usable on a timely basis in the required manner.
-"Confidentiality" means the property that data or infor-
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mation is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised indi-
viduals, entities, or processes.
-"Cryptography" means the discipline that embodies prin-
ciples, means, and methods for the transformation of data in or-
der to hide its information content, establish its authenticity,
prevent its undetected modification, prevent its repudiation,
and/or prevent its unauthorised use.
-"Cryptographic key" means a parameter used with a cryp-
tographic algorithm to transform, validate, authenticate, encrypt
or decrypt data.
-"Cryptographic methods" means cryptographic tech-
niques, services, systems, products and key management systems.
-"Data" means the representation of information in a
manner suitable for communication, interpretation, storage, or
processing.
-"Decryption" means the inverse function of encryption.
-"Encryption" means the transformation of data by the use
of cryptography to produce unintelligible data (encrypted data)
to ensure its confidentiality.
-"Integrity" means the property that data or information
has not been modified or altered in an unauthorised manner.
-"Interoperability" of cryptographic methods means the
technical ability of multiple cryptographic methods to function
together.
-"Key management system" means a system for generation,
storage, distribution, revocation, deletion, archiving, certifica-
tion or application of cryptographic keys.
-"Keyholder" means an individual or entity in possession
or control of cryptographic keys. A keyholder is not necessarily a
user of the key.
-"Law enforcement" or "enforcement of laws" refers to the
enforcement of all laws, without regard to subject matter.
-"Lawful access" means access by third party individuals or
entities, including governments, to plaintext, or cryptographic
keys, of encrypted data, in accordance with law.
-"Mobility" of cryptographic methods only means the tech-
CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE
nical ability to function in multiple countries or information and
communications infrastructures.
.- "Non-repudiation" means a property achieved through
cryptographic methods, which prevents an individual or entity
from denying having performed a particular action related to
data (such as mechanisms for non-rejection of authority (ori-
gin); for proof of obligation, intent, or commitment; or for
proof of ownership).
-- "Personal data" means any information relating to an
identified or identifiable individual.
-"Plaintext" means intelligible data.
-"Portability" of cryptographic methods means the techni-
cal ability to be adapted and function in multiple systems.
IV. INTEGRATION
The principles in Section V of this Annex, each of which ad-
dresses an important policy concern, are interdependent and
should be implemented as a whole so as to balance the various
interests at stake. No principle should be implemented in isola-
tion from the rest.
V. PRINCIPLES
1. TRUST IN CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODS
CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODS SHOULD BE TRUSTWORTHY IN ORDER TO
GENERATE CONFIDENCE IN THE USE OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNI-
CATIONS SYSTEMS.
Market forces should serve to build trust in reliable systems, and
government regulation, licensing, and use of cryptographic
methods may also encourage user trust. Evaluation of crypto-
graphic methods, especially against market-accepted criteria,
could also generate user trust.
In the interests of user trust, a contract dealing with the use of a
key management system should indicate the jurisdiction whose
laws apply to that system.
2. CHOICE OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODS
USERS SHOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO CHOOSE ANY CRYPTOGRAPHIC
METHOD, SUBJECT TO APPLICABLE LAW.
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Users should have access to cryptography that meets their needs,
so that they can trust in the security of information and commu-
nications systems, and the confidentiality and integrity of data
on those systems. Individuals or entities who own, control, ac-
cess, use or store data may have a responsibility to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of such data, and may therefore be
responsible for using appropriate cryptographic methods. It is
expected that a variety of cryptographic methods may be needed
to fulfil different data security requirements. Users of cryptogra-
phy should be free, subject to applicable law, to determine the
type and level of data security needed, and to select and imple-
ment appropriate cryptographic methods, including a key man-
agement system that suits their needs.
In order to protect an identified public interest, such as the pro-
tection of personal data or electronic commerce, governments
may implement policies requiring cryptographic methods to
achieve a sufficient level of protection.
Government controls on cryptographic methods should be no
more than are essential to the discharge of government responsi-
bilities and should respect user choice to the greatest extent pos-
sible. This principle should not be interpreted as implying that
governments should initiate legislation that limits user choice.
3. MARKET DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC
METHODS
CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED IN RESPONSE TO
THE NEEDS, DEMANDS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF INDIVIDUALS, BUSI-
NESSES AND GOVERNMENTS.
The development and provision of cryptographic methods
should be determined by the market in an open and competitive
environment. Such an approach would best ensure that solu-
tions keep pace with changing technology, the demands of users
and evolving threats to information and communications sys-
tems security. The development of international technical stan-
dards, criteria and protocols related to cryptographic methods
should also be market driven. Governments should encourage
and co-operate with business and the research community in the
development of cryptographic methods.
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4. STANDARDS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODS
TECHNICAL STANDARDS, CRITERIA AND PROTOCOLS FOR CRYPTO-
GRAPHIC METHODS SHOULD BE DEVELOPED AND PROMULGATED AT
THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL.
In response to the needs of the market, internationally-
recognised standards-making bodies, governments, business and
other relevant experts should share information and collaborate
to develop and promulgate interoperable technical standards,
criteria and protocols for cryptographic methods. National stan-
dards for cryptographic methods, if any, should be consistent
with international standards to facilitate global interoperability,
portability and mobility. Mechanisms to evaluate conformity to
such technical standards, criteria and protocols for interoper-
ability, portability and mobility of cryptographic methods should
be developed. To the extent that testing of conformity to, or
evaluation of, standards may occur, the broad acceptance of
such results should be encouraged.
5. PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND PERSONAL DATA
THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS TO PRIVACY, INCLUDING
SECRECY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA,
SHOULD BE RESPECTED IN NATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICIES AND IN
THE IMPLEMENTATION AND USE OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODS.
Cryptographic methods can be a valuable tool for the protection
of privacy, including both the confidentiality of data and com-
munications and the protection of the identity of individuals.
Cryptographic methods also offer new opportunities to minimise
the collection of personal data, by enabling secure but anony-
mous payments, transactions and interactions. At the same time,
cryptographic methods to ensure the integrity of data in elec-
tronic transactions raise privacy implications. These implica-
tions, which include the collection of personal data and the crea-
tion of systems for personal identification, should be considered
and explained, and, where appropriate, privacy safeguards
should be established.
The OECD Guidelines for the Protection of Privacy and Trans-
border Flows of Personal Data provide general guidance con-
cerning the collection and management of personal informa-
tion, and should be applied in concert with relevant national law
when implementing cryptographic methods.
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6. LAWFUL ACCESS
NATIONAL CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICIES MAY ALLOW LAWFUL ACCESS TO
PLAINTEXT, OR CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS, OF ENCRYPTED DATA. THESE
POLICIES MUST RESPECT THE OTHER PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE
GUIDELINES TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE.
If considering policies on cryptographic methods that provide
for lawful access, governments should carefully weigh the bene-
fits, including the benefits for public safety, law enforcement
and national security, as well as the risks of misuse, the addi-
tional expense of any supporting infrastructure, the prospects of
technical failure, and other costs. This principle should not be
interpreted as implying that governments should, or should not,
initiate legislation that would allow lawful access.
Where access to the plaintext, or cryptographic keys, of en-
crypted data is requested under lawful process, the individual or
entity requesting access must have a legal right to possession of
the plaintext, and once obtained the data must only be used for
lawful purposes. The process through which lawful access is ob-
tained should be recorded, so that the disclosure of the crypto-
graphic keys or the data can be audited or reviewed in accord-
ance with national law. Where lawful access is requested and ob-
tained, such access should be granted within designated time
limits appropriate to the circumstances. The conditions of lawful
access should be stated clearly and published in a way that they
are easily available to users, keyholders and providers of crypto-
graphic methods.
Key management systems could provide a basis for a possible so-
lution that could balance the interest of users and law enforce-
ment authorities; these techniques could also be used to recover
data, when keys are lost. Processes for lawful access to crypto-
graphic keys must recognise the distinction between keys that
are used to protect confidentiality and keys that are used for
other purposes only. A cryptographic key that provides for iden-
tity or integrity only (as distinct from a cryptographic key that
verifies identity or integrity only) should not be made available
without the consent of the individual or entity in lawful posses-
sion of that key.
CRIMES IN CYBERSPA CE
7. LIABILITY
WHETHER ESTABLISHED BY CONTRACT OR LEGISLATION, THE LIABIL-
ITY OF INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES THAT OFFER CRYPTOGRAPHIC SERV-
ICES OR HOLD OR ACCESS CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS SHOULD BE CLEARLY
STATED.
The liability of any individual or entity, including a government
entity, that offers cryptographic services or holds or has access to
cryptographic keys,' should be made clear by contract or where
appropriate by national legislation or international agreement.
The liability of users for misuse of their own keys should also be
made clear. A keyholder should not be held liable for providing
cryptographic keys or plaintext of encrypted data in accordance
with lawful access. The party that obtains lawful access should be
liable for misuse of cryptographic keys or plaintext that it has
obtained.
8. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
GOVERNMENTS SHOULD CO-OPERATE TO CO-ORDINATE CRYPTOGRA-
PHY POLICIES. As PART OF THIS EFFORT, GOVERNMENTS SHOULD RE-
MOVE, OR AVOID CREATING IN THE NAME OF CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY,
UNJUSTIFIED OBSTACLES TO TRADE.
In order to promote the broad international acceptance of cryp-
tography and enable the full potential of the national and global
information and communications networks, cryptography poli-
cies adopted by a country should be co-ordinated as much as
possible with similar policies of other countries. To that end, the
Guidelines should be used for national policy formulation.
If developed, national key management systems must, where ap-
propriate, allow for international use of cryptography.
Lawful access across national borders may be achieved through
bilateral and multilateral co-operation and agreement.
No government should impede the free flow of encrypted data
passing through its jurisdiction merely on the basis of cryptogra-
phy policy.
In order to promote international trade, governments should
avoid developing cryptography policies and practices that create
unjustified obstacles to global electronic commerce. Govern-
ments should avoid creating unjustified obstacles to interna-
tional availability of cryptographic methods.
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